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V.

DEFENCES.

1. In general.-If the escape was withbut the consent of the
sheriff or other officer, it will be a good defence to any action
therefor that before the commencement of such suit such prisoner
voluntarily returned to the jail from which he had escaped, or to
the liberties thereof; or that the defendant retook such prisoner
and had him in the jail from which he escaped, or within the liberties thereof: 3 R. S. 736, § 85; Drake v. Chester, 2 Com. 473.
But a voluntary escape will not be purged by such return or retaking without affirmance by the plaintiff: Wesson v. Chambe'lain,
3 Com. 351. The sheriff may show by way of defence that the
defendant was not liable to arrest: Phelp8 v. .Barton, 13 Wend.
68; Bay v. Hogeboom, 11 John. 433; Carpenter v. Willett, 1
Keyes 510. But when once in custody, such privilege cannot be
pleaded in bar to an action for escape: Gill v. Miner, 13 Ohio St.
182. Neither can the sheriff take notice of an attorney's privilege
after he has once arrested him: Secor v. Bell, 18 John. 52. It
is not a sufficient answer to an escape that the jail and jail guard
are defective: Green v. Hern, 2 P. & W. 167.
It is no defence in an action for an esbape that execution was
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issued against, the body before one against the property of the
prisoner had been issued and returned : 1?enick v. Orser, 4 Bosw.
(N. Y.) 384. Neither is it a defence to an action for an escape of a
prisoner duly admitted to the jail liberties, that there was a prior
escape, if it appears that the prisoner voluntarily returned into
custody and continued there until the second escape, and it does
not appear that the plaintiff had any notice of the first escape
before the return of the prisoner into custody, and although the
action was brought more than a year after the first escape, and the
defendant pleads the Statute of Limitations: Id. Neither is it a
defence that the party was illegally held in custody: Carpenter v.
eillett,
6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 25. Nor yet that the jail was insufficient:
-Richardsonv. Spenser, 6 Ohio 13.; Commonwealth v. Butt, 2 Id.
348; s. P. Kepter v. Barker, 13 Ohio St. 177; Smith v. Hart,1
Brev. (S.C.) 146. If a sheriff, having final process in his hands,
has an opportunity, but fails, to arrest a debtor, and afterwards
debtor absconds, the sheriff is liable for the amount of execution
and interest, and cannot show the insolvency of the debtor in mitigation of damages: Goodrich v. Starr, 18 Vt. 227. It is also a
good defence that the creditor or his agent procured an escape by a
fraudulent device practised on the prisoner: Dexter v. Adams, 2
Den. (N. Y.) 646.
By 3 R. S., §§ 6 and 7, "any sheriff or other officer who shall
have arrested any prisoner in any county may pass over, across
and through such parts of any other county or counties as shall be
in the ordinary route of travel from the place where such prisoner
shall have been arrested to the place where he is to be conveyed
and delivered, according to the command of the process by which
such arrest shall have been made. Such conveyance shall not, in
any case, be deemed an escape; nor shall the prisoner so conveyed,
or the officers having him in their custody, be liable to arrest on
any civil process while passing through such other county or
counties."
The pleading of this statute would, under such a state of circumstances, be a good defence to the action. Also, should the execution or judgment be void, the sheriff will not be liable for an
escape: Austin v. Fitch, 1 Root (Conn.) 288, but might plead
in bar to .the action. After a voluntary escape plaintiff sues
sheriff, the prisoner is subsequently retaken by sheriff, but is not
deemed in custody under plaintiff's action, and if he again escapes

THE LAW OF ESCAPE IN CIVIL ACTIONS.

plaintiff cannot bring a second action: Littlefield v. Brown (Sup.
Ct. 1828), 1 Wend. 398; 7 Id. (Sup. Ct. 1831) 454, affirmed in
Court of Error 1833.
2. Recapture.-If a prisoner in execution escape without the
assent of the sheriff, &c., and he make fresh pursuit and retake him
before an action brought against him, this shall excuse the sheriff:
Cro. Jac. 657 ; Jon. 144 ; Rol. Abr. 808 ; and a voluntary return of
the prisoner, before action brought, is equal to a retaking upon
fresh pursuit: Bonafons v. Walker, 2 Term R. 126. But if lie
retake him after the action commenced against him, this shall not.
excuse him, nor can it be pleaded to an action that was well attached
before: Rol. Abr. 808, 809; W. Jones 145; Harvey v. .Reyneli,.
Cro. Jac. 657 (2 Strange 873; Stonehouse v. fullins, s. P.);
3 Bacon Abr. 419. If an escaped debtor arrested on mesne process, upon being recaptured is rescued either by himself or others,
the officer is not liable in an action for the escape: JWtehead v.
Keyes, 1 Allen (Mass.) 350. If a man taken in execution be
rescued, he may be retaken, or a scire facias lies against him:
Cro. Car. 240. If, however, the sheriff permits a voluntary escape
with consent of the plaintiff, the debtor never can be retaken by
the sheriff or the plaintiff: Show. 174; 2 Leo. 119.
3. Toid process of commitment.-Where the sheriff suspends proceedings on the production of an insolvent's discharge to the defendant, he incurs the peril of an action if the discharge turns out to be
void: Orange County Bank v. Dubois, 21 Wend. 351 (Bond. Inst.,
vol. 2, p. 550). But the discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus
by a Supreme Court commissioner, though erroneous, was held a
complete bar to an action for an escape: Wiles v. Brown, 3 Barb.
37 ; the court having jurisdiction, though the proceedings were irregular. But where by statute a county courtjudge can only discharge
an insolvent in court, the discharge of one out of term is void for
want of jurisdiction, and if the prisoner is discharged in pursuance
thereof it will be an escape. A writ of error only stays proceedings;
it does not authorize the discharge of a prisoner in execution, and
if the sheriff does discharge him it will be an escape: Sherrill v.
Campbell, 21 Wend. 287. A defendant being in custody of the
sheriff upon a void writ, another writ is lodged against him by the
same party, but the first writ being void lie cannot be detained upon
the second process at the suit of the same party. But if the first
arrest is only irregular the defendant is not privileged from being
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detained at the suit of another party, unless there be some collusion:
Watson 91.
4. Irregularproess.-It is no defence to an action for the escape of a prisoner in execution that the ca. sa. was irregularly issued
without a previous ft. fa. : ,Seott v. Shaw, 13 Johns. 378 ; ifinman
v. Brees. Id. 529 ; Bissell v. Kip, 5 Id. 89 ; Ontario Bank v. Hallett, 8 Cowen 192; Jones v. Cook, 1 Id. 309, g.
If A. obtains judgment against B., and a year afterwards, without any seirc faeias, takes out a capias ad 8atisfaciendum, upon
which B. is taken, and the sheriff lets him go at large, this is an
escape, for though the award of the eapias after the year without a
seire facias was erroneous, yet the sheriff could not take advantage
thereof, for it was sufficient authority for him to make the arrest,
and might have been pleaded by him'in an action of false imprisonment: Cro. Eliz. 188 (Bushe's Case); Shirley.v. Wright, 2 Ld.
Raym. 775; 1 Salk. 273; 2 Id. 700, S. P: adjudged (3 Bac. Abr.
392). Indeed it seems agreed as a general rule, that wherever a
sheriff or other authority has a person in custody by virtue of an
authority from a court having jurisdiction over the matter, the
officer cannot judge of the validity of the process, and, therefore,
cannot take advantage of any errors in them. But if the court had
no jurisdiction in the matter, then all is void, and an escape upon
such void authority is not actionable. This distinction has been
laid down in Moore 274, Dyer 175, Poph. 202, Leon. 80 and
numerous other cases. See also 3 Bac. Abr. 392. Where upon a
recognisance in chancery the conusee sued out execution by a eapia?
ad satisfaciendum by force, whereof the conusor was taken and
escaped, the court held that though the capias in this case was
erroneously awarded, yet it was a good execution as long as it continued unreversed, and, consequently, the sheriff liable for an escape: Coniers, Sheriff of Durham's Case, Cro. Eliz. 576; Ognell
v. Paston,Id. 165 ; Moore 274, and 2 Leon. 84, s. c. and s. P. 8
Co. s. c., cited Leighton v. Gartoons, Cro. Eliz. 707, s. P.
Where the sheriff is ordered by a writ of habeas corpus to bring
up the body of a prisoner in execution, if it is valid on its face,
though irregularly or erroneously allowed, the sheriff will be protected in his ob edience to it: NVoble v. Sitlr, 5 Johns. 357; Wattles v. ,1arsh, 5 Cow. 176.
An irregularity in the process, which does not render it void, but
voidable only, will not excuse .an escape: Watson 139; Hinman
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v. Brees, 13 John. 529 ; Scott v. Shaw, Id. 378. Thus a wrong
title in the name of the chief justice has been held not such an irregularity as would excuse the sheriff for not executing such process: Boss v. Luther, 4 Cow. 188; Rutthinson.v. Brand, 6 Ilow.
73; 5 Seld. 208, s. c. The President, .pe., of Ontario Bank v.
Hfallett, 8 Cow. 192; Scott v. Shaw, 13 John. 378. The sheriff
in fact can never allege error either in the judgment or process as
an excuse for an escape: Rutehinson v. Brand, siqura; Stoddard
v. Turbell, 20 Vt. 321 ; Wfoodruff v. Barrett,15 N. J. L. (3 Green)
40: Stevenson v. -MicLean, 5 Ilumph. (Tenn.) 332.
5. -Dischargebg order of eourt.-If a constable, who has a defendant in execution, discharge him by order even of the justice who
issued the execution, but who has no authorit from the plaintiff,
the constable will be liable for an escape: Van Slyek v. Taylor, 9
John. 146. But the discharge of a prisoner on habeas eoqpus by a
Supreme Court commissioner, though erroneous, was held a complete
bar to an action for an escape, the court in this case having jurisdiction: Wiles v. Brown, 8 Barb. 37. In Saffrey v. Jones, 2 B.
& Ad. 598, it was held to be a good defence to an action against a
sheriff or jailer for an escape, that he discharged the prisoner from
custody by virtue of an order of the insolvent debtor's court ; and
it was not necessary for him to show that the proceedings upon
which the order was grounded were properly taken, or that the insolvent was within the walls of a prison when he petitioned for his
discharge. A sheriff is not liable for arresting or detaining a
debtor, who has executed a deed of assignment under the English
Bankruptcy Act of 1861, sect. 192, after production of a certificate
of registration; the. debtor's remedy being by application to the
court or a judge for his discharge from custody: Ames v. Waterlaw, Law Rep. 5 C. P. 53; 39 L. J. C. P. 41. On the other hand,
B. was, on the 3d of August, served with a writ under the Bills of
Exchange Act at the suit of A., and on the 5th, he executed a
composition deed which was registered on the 13th. On the 15th
judgment was signed for npn-appearance to the writ, and a ca. sa.
issued on the 25th of September, under which he was arrested.
The sheriff having notice of these facts, released him friom custody
on being shown the certificate of registration of the deed: Held,
that the sheriff was liable for an escape: Allen v. Carter,Law Rep.
5 C. P. 414; 39 L. J. 212; 22 L. T. N. S. 586.
A debtor arrested on mesne process brought himself by habeas
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coipus before a judge, by whom he was committed to the custody of the marshal. Shortly afterwards he filed his petition to
.the insolvent debtor's court for his discharge, and that court ordered
that he should be discharged as to the creditor's debt as soon as he
should have been in custody fifteen months. On this lie returned
to the marshal's custody and while there was brought by a habeas
co pus cur causa before the Central Criminal Court, to plead to
an indictment. Hle pleaded not guilty, and traversed to the next
sessions, but as he could not give bail as required, that court committed him to Newgate until discharged in due course of law. Subsequently lie was bailed; whereupon the keeper of Newgate, without any fresh warrant, carried him back to the marshal's custody.
After this, and before the expiration of the fifteen months, he escaped. In an action against the marshal for an escape: Held, that
his charge ceased when he brought the prisoner before the Central
Criminal Court; and that as it had not been revived by any fresh
warrant of commitment, the custody of the prisoner at the time
was illegal; that the marshal therefore was not liable, and that
his conduct in receiving the prisoner did not stop him from saying
that he had no right to detain him: Contant v. Chapman, 2 G. &
D. 191 ; 2 Q. B. 771 ; 6 Jur. 666.
Where an execution creditor is willing to allow a debtor to go
out of prison for a temporary purpose, the custody continuing, the
sheriff may refuse unless ordered by a rule of court; but if, without any rule of court, all parties agree to the debtor leaving prison
and from a laxity of surveillance of the sheriff's officers the debtor
escapes, it is a question of fact for the jury, if the judgment creditor brings an action against the sheriff, whether the judgment creditor did not himself contribute to the escape: Hfaines v. East India
Co., 11 Moore P. C. C. 89.
The marshal of the King's Bench prison was not liable for an
escape in obeying the warrant of commissioners of bankruptcy in
bringing before them a bankrupt confined in his custody charged
in execution, in order to be examined on the second day of the
meeting of the commissioners, though it was not the last day
of examination: Spence v. Jnes, 1 D. & R. 877; 5 B. & Aid.
705.
A bankrupt having escaped out of the custody of the marshal, and
being at large, surrendered to a commission subsequently issued,
and received the protection conferred by 8 Geo. 2, c. 80, s. 5:
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Held, that he might, notwithstanding, be retaken and detained in
custody by the marshal: Anderson v. Hampton, 1 B. & Ald. 308.
6. Reseue.-A rescue is no excuse for a jail-keeper bringing up
a prisoner by habeas corpus, charged with wilful and voluntary
escape: O'Neal v. 2larson, 5 Burr. 2812. A rescue before commitment, of one arrested upon mesne process, subjects the rescuers,
and not the officer who made the arrest, to an action by the creditor:
(Cargill v. Taylor, 10 Mass. 206. But the rescue before commitment is no excuse for the officer,- where the arrest is by virtue of
an execution: Id. A prisoner in custody, charged in execution
upon a final process, being allowed the liberty of the jail, was
arrested on criminal process, and taken to and imprisoned in another
county: Held, that the sheriff was liable for an escape; he was
bound, whether bail for the limits had been given or not, to prevent
the rescue: Brown v. Tracy, 9 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 93. If a mob
riotously and by force demolishes a jail, by which the debtors escape,
the sheriff or jailer is answerable to the creditors for their escape:
Blliott v. -Duke of Norfolk, 4 T. R. 789. In an action for an escape, though the escape was without the knowledge of and without
any fault whatsoever on the part of the jailer, he can in such case
avail himself of fiothing but the act of God, or the king's or country's enemies, as an excuse: Alsept v. Eyles, 2 H. B1. 108; Fairchild v. Case, 24 Wend. 381;" Rainey v. Dunning, 2 Murph.
(N. C.) 386; State v. Halford, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 58.
7. Bondsfor prison bounds or jail limits.-The jailer may suffer
the debtor to have the liberty of the prison rules, without taking a
bond and security from the prisoner not to depart; and so long as
the prisoner keeps within the rules no action lies against the jailer
as for an escape: Steinman v. Tabb, 3 Bibb 202. An escape
made from necessity, and without the consent of the debtor, as
by being 'carried out of the jail in a fit of sickness, does not
violate the condition of a bond given to obtain the liberty of the
yard: Baxter v. Taber, 4 Mass. 361. But see Cargillv. Taylor,
10 Id. 206. A debtor is restricted to the limits fixed by law for
the time being, and is guilty of an escape if he transgress those
limits, though they were more extensive at the time he made the
bond: Reed v. Pullum, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 158. Where a debtor imprisoned on execution was admitted to the liberties of the yard,
upon giving a bond, with a surety, approved by only one justice of
the peace, the jailer was held liable for an escape, the bond not being
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conformable to the statutes of Massachusetts of 1784 and 1811,
under which it is necessary that the surety be approved by the
creditor, or by two justices of the peace, one being of the quorum:
TThitehead v. Varnum, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 523: But if a bond has
been given with two sufficient sureties, although the sureties have
not been approved by two justices of the peace, nor yet by the creditor, such is not an escape according to statute in New Hampshire:
Tappan v. Bellows, 1 N. II. 100.
Where a prisoner, having the jail liberties, went beyond the
limits on a Sunday, returning in the evening: HUeld, that this
was not a voluntary or negligent escape, the sheriff having no power
to restrain him; yet that ic was not such an escape as under the
New York statutes could be purged by return before action brought,
and that the sheriff wag liable in the first instance, he having his
remedy on his bond, that not being assignable: Tillman v.
Lansing, 4 John. 45. A bond for the limits, given by the
defendant, who had been charged in the execution and to whom the
plaintiff had previously given permission to go where he pleased,
does not revive the judgment so that an action can be maintained
against the sheriff for an escape: Powcher v. Tolley, 3 Wend.
184. A debtor on the prison bounds has a right to go anywhere within the jail limits that other persons have, who are not
confined to such limits: Lurky v. Brandon, 1 Ohio 49. Where
the jail limits include the whole of a county, and after a prisoner
is charged in 'execution, a part of the county is set off to a new one,
such prisoner has the privilege of the limits of the old county:
Kent v. Burmett, 10 Ohio 892.
In Pennsylvania it is not an escape to allow a prisoner the liberty
of the jail yard: Green v. Hem, 2 P. & W. 167. In Rhode Island the doctrine as to escapes is that of the-common law, and the
statutes giving the limits to prisoners have not altered the common law: Steer v. Field, 2 Mason 486. And at common law
a jailer is not liable for an escape in allowing prisoners, confined
for debt, the liberty of all the apartments within the walls of the
jail ; the confinement within the walls is salva et areta eustodia:
Id. But to admit a prisoner to the liberties, except in the cases
expressly provided by statute, in Vermont, 'renders the jailer liable
for an escape: Leonard v. Boyt, Brayt. 78. In an action on
bond for the limits it is a good plea in bar that the prisoner had
been discharged as an insolvent and then the sheriff liberated him:
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Hayden v. 1'abn r, 2 1till 205; s. c. 7 Id. 385. Going beyond
the liberties without necessity is an escape: Bissell v. fip, 5
John. 89.
Where a debtor in ca. sa. gives a bond under the Prison Bounds
Act and escapes beyond the limits, but remains in the county, the
sheriff is not liable for not re-arresting and committing him at the
expiration of the six calendar months. The creditors' remedy is
upon the prison bound bond: Gunn v. Davis, 26 Ga. 169. Where
the defendant, who had given bond for prison bounds, goes without
the limits, and the plaintiff afterwards sues out a second execution
for an escape and imprisons the defendant, it shall exonerate the
security to the bond given to the sheriff: Osborne v. Bowman, 2
Bay 208.
The sheriff is answerable for the solvency of the security taken
under the Prison Bounds Act, and though the security was good
when taken, the sheriff is liable to the plaintiff: Clarke & Co. v.
Moore, 1 Tr. Con. Rep. 150. See also Yates v. Yeadon, 4 McCord
18. Where party has given security for prison bounds, and
escapes, sheriff can retake him and put him into a state of confinement: Id.
In Indiana, if an execution debtor escape from prison bounds,
the bond for the limits is forfeited and his subsequent return to the
bounds, before commencement of suit on the bond, is no defence to
such suit: Shader v. .Frost, 4 Blackf 190. And an action for
debt lies against the sheriff for an escape on executibn, the English
statutes being in force in Indiana: Gwinn v. Hubbard,3 Blackf. 14.
In Georgia a sheriff is not liable for not recommitting at the
end of six months a debtor arrested under a ca. sa., who has given
bonds under the Georgia Act of 1820 to take the prison bounds
and. has broken the bond by going beyond the prison limits: Gunn
v. Da'is, 26 Ga. 169.
A sheriff has no control over the body of a debtor after he has
given bond for the liberty 'of the yard, except in cases specified in
the Maine Act of 1822, c. 209: Codman, v. Lowell, 3 Me. (3
Greenl.) 52. By New York Act of 1801, if a prisoner who has
given bond for the liberties,'voluntarily goes beyond them, his bond
is forfeited, and the sheriff may retake him on fresh pursuit and
recommit him to custody: Jansen v. Hilton, 10 John. 549;
Barry v. fandell, Id. 563. If the sheriff permits the prisoner to
have the liberty of the yard on his giving bond, according to la,
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